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Abstract— Demand response for residential consumers is making 
a slow progression, despite its benefits towards various market 
participants, and the growing importance of distribution grids in 
light of the integration of distributed and renewable energy 
sources, and new demand applications. While some obstacles are 
techno-economic in nature, there also exist barriers related to 
regulation. The objective of this paper is to provide an overview 
of the Flemish regulatory framework concerning demand 
response, as well as to identify the main regulatory barriers to 
implementation for residential consumers. It is found that in some 
areas, the current regulatory framework is inadequate or 
incomplete. An analysis of the relevant literature allows to classify 
these barriers into six categories. 
Index Terms-- Demand Response, Distribution Grid, Regulation, 
Smart Grids 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Historically, electricity markets in Europe were 
characterized by a top-down organization, with the generation 
side balancing the power system. During the 1990s, the 
European Union and its Member States decided to set in motion 
a process of liberalization and deregulation. Simultaneously, 
the traditional approach to system operation started changing 
towards a new paradigm: from a generation centered approach, 
to a market characterized by active demand involvement [1].  
Nowadays, the demand side is increasingly participating. 
However, when demand response is implemented, it is 
primarily by large consumers trading on the wholesale market 
[2]. Although residential consumers possess ample flexibility, 
the current market model does not allow for it to be fully 
exploited [3]. Retail prices are generally fixed, reflecting 
average costs over longer time periods. Hence, they provide 
little cost-reflectiveness and limited price responsiveness.  
At the same time, the importance of the distribution grid is 
growing steadily, because of the emergence of distributed and 
renewable generation (e.g. wind turbines and photovoltaics), as 
well as new demand applications (e.g. electric vehicles and heat 
pumps). Given the limited amount of electricity storage 
possibilities, demand response may play a significant role in 
dealing with the challenges related to consumption volatility, 
peak demand, and the variable nature of renewable generation. 
The question now arises why residential demand response 
is not yet in place, and how it can be enabled. Although there 
undoubtedly exist techno-economic challenges, a great deal of 
the current stagnation can be explained by obstacles related to 
regulation.  
The objective of this paper is to analyze the current 
regulatory framework concerning demand response in Flemish 
distribution systems. Additionally, the aim is to identify the 
different regulatory obstacles. Section II sets the scene by 
clarifying the concept of demand response and discussing the 
associated potential benefits. Section III then describes the 
relevant legal framework on both the European, the Belgian and 
the Flemish level. Section IV lists and examines the primary 
regulatory barriers to implementation which originate from this 
legal and regulatory framework. A last section concludes. 
II. DEMAND RESPONSE: SCOPE AND BENEFITS 
In academic literature, demand response is usually defined 
as a change in consumption patterns of electricity consumers in 
response to time-varying tariff structures or incentive payments 
in order to operate the electricity system in a more efficient and 
reliable way [1].  
Demand response programs are typically classified into two 
main categories: price-based programs and incentive-based 
programs [4]. Fig. 1 provides an overview of each program and 
its subcomponents.  
DEMAND RESPONSE
Price-based
Incentive-based
Time-of-Use Pricing
Critical Peak Pricing
Real-time Pricing
Direct Load Control
Curtailable Load
Demand Bidding
Emergency DR
Capacity Market
Ancillary Services  
Figure 1.  Demand response program categorization. 
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In price-based programs, dynamic tariff structures reflect 
the actual cost of generating, transporting and supplying 
electricity [4]. Their aim is to shift consumption from periods 
where costs are high to periods where costs are low. In 
incentive-based programs, end-users receive payments for 
participating and for reducing their load at certain times. The 
different subcategories of both types of demand response 
programs are discussed in several research papers [4] [5]. 
The following classification of demand response benefits is 
made in academic literature [1]: 
 Benefits towards participating consumers 
 Market-wide benefits 
 System reliability improvements 
 Market performance benefits 
By participating during peak hours, consumers can achieve 
electricity bill savings [1] [6].  
Moreover, demand response programs are expected to lead 
to a market-wide electricity price reduction, because expensive 
peak plants have to be ramped up less frequently [1]. 
Additionally, grid infrastructure investments can be avoided or 
deferred [7]. Associated with the reduced deployment of peak 
plants and infrastructural investments is a society-wide 
environmental benefit. Studies suggest that EU-wide 
deployment of demand response by 2020 can create 100 TWh 
of annual energy savings and an annual environmental benefit 
of a 30 million tons CO2 reduction [8].  
Furthermore, demand response programs give grid operators 
more tools to deal with congestion issues and to safeguard 
system reliability and balance [9].  
Demand response programs are also expected to improve 
electricity market performance by providing the market with 
more choices and opportunities for active participation, and by 
reducing concentration of market power through price 
responsiveness [10]. 
III. THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
Just like any other sector, the power industry is subject to a 
collection of rules and principles. Regulation can be defined as 
a set of principles used to control, direct or manage an activity, 
an organization or a system [11]. This is based on the idea that 
free markets are subject to inefficiencies, making interference 
necessary. 
Regulation is often confused with legislation, since the law 
and courts ultimately have the same objective. However, while 
legislation is enforced ex-post, regulation enforces the ‘rules of 
the game’ ex-ante. 
At the same time, the law constitutes an important 
foundation for regulatory activities. For this reason, the most 
important legal provisions in the context of demand response 
programs in distribution systems are discussed in the following 
subsections. In particular, three policy levels are examined: 
international (the European Union), national (Belgium) and 
regional (Flanders). 
A. International: the European Union 
During the last decade, the European Union (EU) set in 
motion a process of restructuring and liberalization, 
emphasizing consumer protection against monopoly power and 
the threat of unjustifiably high prices or a lack of service 
quality. One of the primary goals of the European Union is the 
establishment of an internal energy market [12].  
Additionally, the EU holds on to a trinity of electricity 
market objectives: security of supply, sustainability and 
competitiveness [13]. These high-level goals form the basis for 
most EU legislation concerning the electricity sector, and they 
are being reflected in the national laws of the Member States. 
The EU created several legally binding commitments, which 
are discussed below. 
i. The 2020 Climate and Energy Package 
In 2007-2008, The EU adopted a framework for greenhouse 
gas emission savings by 2020, the so-called ’20-20-20 targets’: 
 An EU-wide reduction in greenhouse gas emissions of 
at least 20% below the level of 1990. 
 An increase of EU-wide renewables generation to 
20% of the associated consumption level. 
 A 20% reduction in primary energy consumption 
compared to projected levels by means of energy 
efficiency. 
Directive 2009/28/EC sets national targets concerning 
renewables generation. Note that, although this Directive does 
not specifically mention demand response, Art. 16§1 
encourages Member States to take the necessary steps to make 
the grid more intelligent and to facilitate the integration of 
renewables [14]. 
An integrated policy framework for the periods up to 2030 
and up to 2050 is currently being developed. This framework 
contains additional measures regarding greenhouse gas 
emissions, renewable generation, energy efficiency, emission 
rights, competition and security of supply [15] 
ii. The Third Energy Package 
This legal package was launched in 2009. Its aim was to 
further open up the European energy markets, with an emphasis 
on ownership unbundling and the creation of national 
regulatory authorities (NRAs). Two pieces of legislation are of 
particular importance: 
 Directive 2009/72/EC: proposition of common rules 
for the internal market in electricity [16].  
 Regulation 713/2009: establishment of the Agency for 
Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) [17]. 
Directive 2009/72/EC does not propose demand response in 
a context of residential consumers. However, Annex 1§2 of this 
law compels all Member States to execute an 80% roll-out of 
smart meters by 2020, given a positive long-term cost-benefit 
analysis. These meters may play an important role in the 
implementation of demand response [18]. 
iii. The Energy-efficiency Directive 
The aim of this Directive  (2012/27/EU) is the development 
of a set of rules and measures for the promotion of energy 
efficiency [19].  
This Directive mentions the importance of demand response 
as an instrument for energy-efficiency improvement [20]. 
Furthermore, it recognizes that demand response entails 
different subcategories and it mentions residential consumers in 
this context. Additionally, an aggregator is defined as “a 
demand service provider that combines multiple short-duration 
consumer loads for sale or auction in organized energy 
markets” [20]. 
iv. Privacy, data handling and consumer protection 
Demand response goes hand in hand with increased 
consumption data processing, since it is crucial to measure the 
extent to which consumers adapt their behavior in response to 
signals.  
On a European level, the primary piece of legislation 
regarding privacy is Directive 95/46/EG, which establishes 
rules on the protection of natural persons with respect to 
processing of personal data [21]. 
Furthermore, Art. 8 of the European Convention On Human 
Rights (ECHR) describes the right to respect for private life 
[22]. Also Art. 7 and Art. 8 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union (2010/C 83/02) are related to 
privacy and data protection [23]. 
Lastly, ISO/CEI 27001 and ISO/CEI 27002 are 
international standards concerning information technology, 
security techniques and management systems for information 
security [24]. 
B. National: Belgium 
i. The Electricity Act 
The Electricity Act of April 29, 1999 covers the 
organization of the Belgian electricity market. In particular, it 
deals with centralized generation, the transmission system, 
power exchanges (Belpex), and the tasks of the national 
regulator CREG.  
Despite several amendments, this law still does not directly 
deal with demand response for residential consumers, but Art 
2, 27° defines the concept of energy-efficiency and demand side 
management as an integrated approach aimed at influencing the 
size and timing of electricity consumption so as to reduce peak 
load and primary energy consumption. 
Furthermore, Art 8§1bis states that an economic analysis of 
the costs and benefits associated with smart meters has to be 
made by December 2012, following Directive 2009/72/EC. 
ii. Privacy, data handling and consumer protection 
In Belgium, the primary legislative act related to privacy is 
the Law of December 8, 1992. Together with this act, an 
independent organization was established, the Privacy 
Commission (CBPL), which monitors and enforces the 
practical application of the law.  
The Privacy Law rules that personal data can only be used 
after explicit consent by the associated person, or when it is 
justified by the associated objectives. Art. 4 and 5 list 
numerous conditions under which personal data can be 
obtained and processed.  
The principle of finality requires that data processers only 
collect data for well-defined and justified goals, and only use 
data in a compatible way with said objectives. The principle of 
proportionality, on the other hand, rules that personal data 
processing should always be restricted to the minimum 
required.  
For all matters with respect to trading practices and 
consumer protection, consumers can rely on the law of April 
6, 2010 (WMPC). 
C. Regional: Flanders 
i. The Energy Decree 
This decree was approved in 2009 by the Flemish 
Government. Its primary objectives are (Art. 2.1.1): 
 Guaranteeing the functioning of the Flemish 
electricity and gas market;  
 Guaranteeing security of supply in Flanders;  
 Stimulating energy-efficiency, energy savings and the 
development of sustainable energy sources;  
 Facilitating the interconnection of energy networks. 
Art. 3.1.1 and beyond deals with the creation and the tasks 
of the Flemish regulator VREG. In Belgium, the assignment of 
distribution system operators (DSOs), the bestowment of 
supply licenses, the creation of technical codes regarding 
distribution and policies concerning RES are all regional 
affairs. However, the determination of distribution grid tariffs 
is still a national endeavor. This will change in the course of 
2014, following the so-called “Vlinderakkoord” [25]. 
The Energy Decree also provides a list of tasks attributed to 
the DSO (Art. 4.1.6). Art. 4.2.1 authorizes the VREG to 
formulate a separate technical code for electricity and gas 
DSOs.  
Following European Directives, a number of metering-
related articles have been added (e.g. the definition of a smart 
meter (Art. 1.1.3 113°/1)). Art. 4.1.22 /2 imposes a cost-benefit 
analysis on the Flemish government, due September 3, 2012. 
Installation, (de)activation, maintenance and the repair of 
meters is attributed to the DSO by Art. 4.1.6. 
The Energy Decree does not comprise legally binding 
articles related to demand response. Art. 4.1.18/1 is currently 
being developed. Grid operators still have to collaborate with 
energy service companies (ESCOs), aggregators and 
consumers for the creation of technical specifications 
concerning participation of the demand side on balancing 
markets and other supporting services in distribution grids.  
ii. Other documents of interest 
After being approved in 2010, the Energy Resolution 
officially came into operation in January 2011. It bundles and 
substitutes all existing decisions related to energy policy. 
However, this act still does not mention demand response, nor 
smart metering. 
Furthermore, the technical code for distribution grids 
contains general principles regarding exchange of data, 
confidentiality, procedures, as well as rules with respect to grid 
planning, grid access, measurement activities and 
collaboration between grid operators. It does not yet contain 
any provisions or procedures related to smart metering or 
demand response. 
In the latest Flemish governmental agreement, the 
administration takes a positive stance on the roll-out of smart 
meters and the development of smarter electricity grids. With 
regard to smart meters, it seems that the question is not if, but 
rather when and how to proceed with a roll-out. “Flanders in 
action” is a collection of Flemish projects, bundled in “Pact 
2020”, with the aim of moving Flanders towards a more 
sustainable and innovative environment. The administration 
has established a number of pilot projects to test a large-scale 
smart meter roll-out, and to analyze the associated long-term 
costs and benefits. 
IV. REGULATORY BARRIERS TO DEMAND RESPONSE 
In this section, a number of regulatory obstacles related to 
implementation of demand response in Flanders is discussed. 
While some of them may require little effort to solve, others 
pose a more fundamental problem. Fig. 2 provides an overview 
of six regulatory aspects which substantially impact the 
deployment of demand response. 
REGULATORY 
BARRIERS
DSO 
Remuneration
Market EntryMarket Roles
Standardization
Tariff 
Regulation
Privacy & 
Consumer 
Protection
 
Figure 2.  Overview of the primary regulatory barriers. 
A. Barriers related to DSO remuneration 
With respect to remuneration of distribution network 
activities, grid operators and utilities in Europe traditionally 
underwent ‘cost-of-service regulation’. This means that the 
regulator has to approve operational and investment expenses, 
demanding a minimum service quality and paying the 
associated costs in return via regulated tariffs charged to 
consumers [11]. While this ensures cost-reflective prices, a 
stable investment environment and security of supply, it creates 
a significant risk of cost-inflation due to asymmetric 
information and a lack of efficiency incentives.  
For this reason, power market regulation is nowadays more 
incentive-based [11]. Retail Price Index regulation (RPI-X) in 
particular is the most common form. Under this mechanism, 
regulatory authorities set the maximum revenues or prices that 
grid operators are allowed to charge for a period of 4 to 5 years. 
These revenue caps are largely based on historical expenses and 
benchmarking techniques. They incentivize regulated players 
to be more cost-efficient, at the expense of lost cost-
reflectiveness in prices [11].  
With this type of DSO remuneration, a number of issues 
arise that negatively impact the development of innovative 
technologies in general, and demand response in particular. 
 Revenue allowances are based on historically incurred 
costs [26]. Hence, little attention is given to future 
needs of the grid. 
 Regulatory periods are relatively short (4 to 5 years). 
Outputs associated with certain inputs may not be 
realized in the same regulatory period. Because of this, 
companies are more incentivized to cut in OPEX (e.g. 
demand response pilots) than in CAPEX (e.g. grid 
expansion) [27] [13].  
 When determining the allowed revenue base, 
regulators focus on benefits towards the DSO, rather 
than market-wide benefits associated with positive 
externalities (e.g. suppliers being able to use smart 
meters for sending price signals)  [26]. 
 New investments experience a significant delay before 
they are recognized in the revenue base (i.e. the 
CAPEX time-shift problem) [26]. 
 Regulators use benchmarking techniques, reference 
networks and standard cost methods to assess cost-
efficiency. R&D costs are often not accepted as 
efficient costs [13]. 
In Flanders, the regulator VREG will become responsible 
for distribution tariffs in the course of 2014, as a result of the 
sixth state reform [25]. Discussions on the adaptation of DSO 
remuneration and the tariff mechanism are now ongoing [28].  
B. Barriers related to tariff regulation 
The shift towards incentive-based regulation of DSOs was 
partly based on the idea that consumers should be protected 
against large price variations, and that improved cost-efficiency 
would reduce prices in the long run. Hence, distribution tariffs 
are typically flat and based on energy consumption volume. 
Naturally, the current philosophy of flat tariffs makes grid 
operators and other investors reluctant to fund pilot projects for 
technologies that are based on variable pricing. Furthermore, 
this tariff methodology does not account for the fact that grid 
users and connected technologies are becoming increasingly 
complex. 
One of the major problems related to current distribution 
grid tarification is that, by socializing most costs, it violates the 
principle of cost-causality, which states that agents should be 
charged in accordance with the costs they cause to the system. 
Furthermore, it does not account for the true drivers of 
distribution costs:  geographical location, subscribed capacity, 
contribution to distribution peaks and contribution to system 
losses [13]. Instead, it erodes the level playing field between 
distribution grid connected agents by creating cross-subsidies. 
Another important aspect to consider is the emergence of 
so-called electricity ‘prosumers’. Up until now, tariffs for 
residential consumers in Flanders typically focused on 
downstream electricity flows. This triggered a debate on the 
deployment of injection tariffs for distributed generation. As a 
result, since 2009 DSOs charge injection tariffs for all 
distribution grid connected generators with a capacity higher 
than 10kW [29]. 
C. Barriers related to market roles 
As mentioned earlier, the most important Belgian and 
Flemish electricity market laws do not incorporate a clear 
definition of the responsibilities and competences of new 
participants such as aggregators and ESCOs. Yet, the 
development of these new intermediaries is crucial because, as 
opposed to supply side flexibility, demand side flexibility is not 
the ‘core business’ of consumers. 
An important question that arises concerns the 
responsibility for investment in new ICT and metering 
equipment, the ownership of said infrastructure, and rules with 
regard to management of the associated data. Additionally, 
market players may be concerned about possible conflicts of 
interest or competition disturbances. Demand response has an 
important impact on the balancing exercise of BRPs, and 
ownership of infrastructure can significantly influence its roll-
out and market competition. Smart meters, for instance, can be 
considered strategic assets, which can impede supplier 
switching when they are not owned by a regulated party such 
as the DSO. 
Smart meter developments have also fueled the discussion 
on data handling responsibilities. Detailed consumption data 
can be a valuable commercial asset, and a clear division of roles 
is important to avoid potential abuse. In Belgium, the DSO is 
currently responsible for data management, but the debate on 
future changes is still ongoing. This may be the preferable 
alternative, since they are neutral, non-commercial and 
regulated entities, responsible for grid stability and security of 
supply. It can be argued that making them dependent on 
commercial parties for data availability is not preferable. 
Furthermore, they are easier to monitor and non-discriminatory 
to third parties, provided sufficient unbundling. 
D. Barriers related to market entry 
Current regulations typically impose minimum 
requirements on services in order to qualify for participation 
on wholesale markets such as the reserve market, the day-
ahead markets and intra-day market. Examples of such 
requirements include: fixed trading charges (such as 
membership and entrance fees), minimum trading volume and 
minimum available capacity. For instance, the Belgian spot 
market (Belpex) requires membership costs of up to €25,000 
for full access [30]. These trading conditions may impede the 
ability of (smaller) aggregators to participate. Hence they 
restrict the development of demand response services.  
Another relevant issue in this context is the lack of 
unbundling. Despite European liberalization efforts, markets 
are still highly concentrated, with more than half of European 
DSOs not being unbundled [13]. In Belgium, 21% of the 
Flemish DSO Eandis is still owned by Electrabel nv, a private 
company active in generation and supply of electricity and gas 
[31]. Insufficient unbundling of DSOs can effectively block 
competition on the retail market [32].  
Electricity markets are also still highly concentrated. In 
several countries, more than 80% of generation is still 
controlled by former incumbents [33]. This means that the 
existing supply-side flexibility can benefits from scale 
economies, which makes participation by demand-side 
flexibility sources more difficult. 
E. Barriers related to standardization 
Despite the fact that standardization of products and 
services has an important impact on investment interest and 
market competitiveness and liquidity, there is a lack of EU-
wide and national standardization. For example, although the 
EU communicated its opinion on smart meter functionalities, 
there are still no legally binding minimum requirements [34]. 
Furthermore, there is a need for clear legal definitions of 
new smart grid concepts. For example, neither the Energy-
efficiency Directive, nor Belgian and Flemish legal acts provide 
a comprehensive definition of the term ‘smart grid’, which 
leaves freedom to decide on the interpretation [20]. 
It is important to recognize that many important 
technologies are already available, but that the true challenge 
may lie in their interoperability and in the integration in existing 
infrastructure. 
In recent years, CEN, CENELEC and ETSI have been 
working on the development of a set of standards for smart 
meters, smart grids and communication protocols, based on EC 
mandates M/441 and M/490. 
F. Barriers related to privacy and consumer protection 
Although there exists a broad legal framework on privacy 
and data security on the EU level, there is a lack of sector-
specific rules in the context of demand response. This may 
hamper not only investment interest but first, and foremost, 
consumer acceptance. Current regulations are designed to 
support data processing for billing purposes, which takes place 
only a few times per year.  
In the Belgian privacy law, personal data is defined as data 
referring to directly or indirectly identifiable natural persons 
(Art. 1§1). In a context of smart meters for instance, this 
definition is quite broad, since it applies to all information that 
can be linked to a single and unique meter number (EAN-
number), which is in turn linked to a consumer. 
Because privacy law is prone to interpretation, and because 
of a lack of clear rules regarding confidentiality, data handling 
and security, investors are not incentivized to proceed with a 
smart meter roll-out. An EU-wide framework may create more 
regulatory stability for investors, as well as bolster demand 
response acceptance by the European consumer. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This paper analyzes the regulatory framework regarding 
demand response in Flemish distribution systems, describing 
the most important regulatory principles and legal provisions 
on several policy levels (European, Belgian and Flemish). It is 
found that national and regional legislation in Belgium is 
significantly impacted by the European legal framework in 
general, and the Third Energy Package, the Energy-efficiency 
Directive and the 20-20-20 targets in particular. 
Six categories of regulatory barriers with respect to 
implementation of demand response are identified. It is found 
that that current DSO revenue allowance mechanisms and grid 
tarification methods are inherently flawed in supporting 
innovation and in creating a level playing field among grid 
users. Furthermore, the development and roll-out of new 
technologies is being hindered by a lack of clear roles and 
responsibilities regarding infrastructural investments and new 
services, a lack of standardization, and the existence of market 
entry barriers such as minimum capacity or trading volume 
requirements. Finally, it is found that the absence of a clear, 
sector-specific framework regarding privacy and data security 
limits the acceptance of new demand response technologies by 
investors and consumers alike. 
It can be concluded that a significant overhaul and 
expansion of the regulatory framework may be necessary to 
spur both industry and consumer interest in demand response. 
While slow progression can be justified by technological or 
economic limitations, it is imperative to remove some artificial 
barriers such as those created by regulatory constraints. A 
major challenge in this regard is streamlining the Flemish 
framework with the European regulatory model while still 
accounting for local needs and differences. 
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